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“I do imagine they will say 
When 
Your eyes are red 
With weeping bleaching white rum 
Or 
Cannabis sativa L., 
They will point and say 
YOU ARE UDP!!! 
But if, if your heart is blue 
Blue in 
Despair, longing, or unrequited 
Love 
They will quickly conclude, 
YOU ARE PUP!!!! 
It will not occur to them 
Even though 
Your teeth may be white, 
As white as the white in the red, 
As white as the white in the blue 
How excruciating for them ever to admit, 
Perhaps you may be both.” 
 
‘Maverick’ by Evan X Hyde 
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Introduction 
 
At a time when questions continue to be raised over the future of democratic 
transitions in the rest of Central America, the case of Belize offers a different perspective. 
From the 1950s, through self-government and then independence, this small Caribbean 
country on the Central American isthmus has proudly preserved an uninterrupted 
democratic heritage. With a tradition of free and fair elections, a politicised electorate, 
and (since 1984) alternating ruling parties, Belizean democracy is superficially strong. 
And yet, the last decade of People’s United Party (PUP) government has witnessed 
major and serious problems for Belize’s democracy: the exposure of acute corruption, 
political patronage continuing unabated, and increasing disillusionment of the electorate 
with the artificial polarisation created by both political parties. This work asks whether 
such democratic decay can be sufficiently explained and addressed by dominant 
understandings of democracy in which ‘procedure’ is paramount, and seeks to offer an 
alternative interpretation. The dissertation draws on research in Belize between June and 
July 2007, involving both archival research in Belmopan and a series of interviews with 
prominent individuals in civil society and politics.    
 
The first chapter outlines the dominant view that Belize’s current malaise can be 
understood as the result of a failure to live up to Western democratic ideals and norms.  
Adopting a procedural and minimalist Schumpeterian definition of democracy, actors 
both in government and civil society have responded to perceived democratic decay by 
advocating political reform. The second chapter suggests that this perspective has its 
limitations, and therefore adopts a different methodological approach, drawing on the 
work of Laurence Whitehead on democratic transitions as drama (2002) and Harald 
Wydra on communist transitions in Eastern Europe (2007). This interpretive approach, 
thus far not applied to the Anglophone Caribbean, emphasises the need to see 
democracy as a creative “process of meaning formation” (Wydra 2007: 270) which 
occurs before and outside of the institutionalisation of formal procedural rules. Belizean 
democracy, in short, has its roots in the colonial oppression of the past. The process can 
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only, however, be understood as a historically and culturally specific experience. It 
therefore requires the abandonment of the “normative model of full political democracy, 
generated outside the historical context” that has thus far remained “the axis of 
analysis” (Wydra 2007: 279). Accordingly, this second chapter then explores three 
potentially transformative experiences in Belizean history: (i) the labour movements of 
the 1930s, (ii) the radical politics of the 1960s and early 1970s, and (iii) independence in 
1981. These experiences, despite having a limited immediate impact, left a powerful 
symbolic memory in the Belizean consciousness that the current interpretation of 
democracy fails to fully appreciate.  
 
The third chapter, breaking from an experiential analysis, suggests rather more 
speculatively that despite the failure of these past movements there may be signs of an 
opportunity for a new democratic awakening in Belize. Central to this is a broadened 
understanding of civil society which places it at the very centre of democratic 
transitions. Ultimately, however, whether or not this latest opportunity to reject the 
myths propagated by a continuing neo-colonial system will be taken, should it arise, 
may depend on the willingness of Belizean civil society to rally around a different 
narrative of what constitutes democracy. Without this new narrative, it may be 
impossible for Belizean citizens to reject the intuitively appealing myth, sung about so 
often in the national anthem, that Belize is a “tranquil haven of democracy”, that “no 
tyrants [here] linger”, and to embrace instead the lived experience of democracy as it has 
historically existed in Belize. 
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1 Facing democratic decay: the limits of a procedural 
definition 
 
1.1 Democracy as procedure 
The procedural definition of democracy was perhaps best formulated by Joseph 
Schumpeter. In his 1942 classic Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter 
challenged the ‘classical’ doctrine of democracy for invoking the people as a source of 
legitimacy for rule, when in fact they were the source in name only. Athenian 
democracy, famously excluding slaves and women, had justified an empire on the 
superiority of this form of government. Hobbes’ Leviathan, Rousseau’s general will and 
social contract and, more recently, Marx’s dictatorship of the proletariat were all, 
according to this view, also tainted with the same brush of illusory democracy.  
 
While Schumpeter recognised that a representative democracy, involving the 
people only at election time, fell short of the ideal in many ways, it was the introduction 
of the process of voting and selecting leaders which elevated it to a new, more 
meaningful level. It was the procedure and the process – rule by the people rather than 
of or for the people – which made democracy more than an empty promise. Crucially, 
Schumpeter’s distinction has prevailed in the post-World War era in efforts to describe, 
analyse and predict waves of democratisation. As Huntington puts it, “the prevailing 
effect was to make democracy less of a ‘hurrah’ word and more of a commonsense 
word” (1991: 7).  
 
The modifications and enhancements of this argument, though important, have 
tended to seek analytical precision (e.g. Dahl 1956, 1989) rather than challenge the basic 
premise. While the emphasis given to different criteria has been much debated in 
democratisation studies (Przeworski 1986; Cavarozzi 1992; Linz & Stepan 1996; 
O’Donnell 1999), the task of classifying democracies remains a relatively straightforward 
one. It is suggested here that such assumptions about the concept have not only 
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underpinned the way that democracy, and its apparent decay and increasing failure, 
have been interpreted in Belize, but that they are also central to the future imaginations 
held in the Belizean consciousness.  
 
1.2 The political system 
Along with former British colonial territories in the Caribbean, Belize adopted 
the ‘Westminster model’ as its system of government during the lengthy decolonisation 
process from the 1950s to independence in 1981. As one interviewee explained, the 
question of other potential models was simply not a part of the discussion: 
 
“The discussion back then was decolonisation… So the country grew up with 
that, they didn’t know anything else… I didn’t see it in terms of corruption … I didn’t 
have a chance to review whether the party system was the best route to go or not” (Hulse: 
2007). 
 
In this context it was the PUP which, having identified itself with the anti-
colonial struggle from its inception in the 1930s, was able to harness much of the 
country’s electoral support. The PUP’s hegemony continued until the national elections 
of 1974 when the United Democratic Party (UDP), newly formed out of the National 
Independence Party (NIP), Liberal Party and People’s Democratic Movement (PDM), 
first became a serious threat. The UDP then won elections for the first time in 1984 and 
again in 1993, but lost to the PUP in 1989, 1998 and 2003. This means that Belize has now 
had four alternations in ruling party, demonstrating on the surface a healthy two-party 
system. 
 
Belizean political parties have had a remarkably centralised decision-making 
process. George Price, the much-celebrated founding father of Belizean politics and 
Prime Minister until 1984, was renowned for his ability in the PUP’s early years to 
handle discontents and bring them under the umbrella of the catch-all populist party. 
But the momentum of the nationalist movement could not be sustained over a period of 
three decades. As the PUP became accustomed to power, the populism became of a 
rather different, more disconnected sort. With the arrival of the controversial question of 
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constitutional change in the early 1960s and the increasing use of government-owned 
radio, “the PUP government did not maintain the same premium on mass meetings as a 
direction-giver, as a mood tester, as a solidarity-builder and as a means of 
communication between its leaders and followers” (Grant 1976: 246). This trend towards 
centralisation has persisted in PUP party politics until today. Indeed, even recent 
Cabinet infighting – involving the so-called ‘G7’ in 2004 when seven ministers resigned 
from Cabinet and, earlier this year, the resignation again by two of these same popular 
renegade ministers, Mark Espat and Cordel Hyde – seems to have not been able to 
influence the direction of the party. 
 
The UDP, despite its apparent conservatism, also tries to play up its popular 
links; in this case through its approach in the 1980s and 1990s of actively involving local 
youth supporters as candidates at a high level in the party. PUP supporters, however, 
claim this is nothing more than a desperate solution to a lack of leadership talent in the 
UDP. Arguably, moreover, the image of a decentralised UDP is born of the party’s 
origins as a coalition party in which the three constituent factions initially preserved a 
strong degree of their own identity, requiring constant internal debate. Today, there 
remain powerful centrist and right-wing factions within the UDP which continue to 
require a means of resolving their differences constructively. While the UDP may make 
claims to possess a marginally less centralised power structure, therefore, both parties 
remain guided by a select few at the top.  
 
1.3 The nature of the PUP/UDP division 
While Belizean society is deeply polarised along PUP and UDP party lines – with 
families often split into blue and red camps respectively – the ideological differences are 
becoming increasingly obscure. Traditionally, the PUP was the left-of-centre party of 
social justice while the UDP sees itself as a conservative party, promoting its record of 
fiscal conservatism under previous Prime Minister Dr. Manuel Esquivel in contrast to 
the current PUP government’s borrowing of enormous loans (Faber 2007). Nevertheless, 
these traditional differences have become increasingly slight. As UDP Chairman Doug 
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Singh suggested, for dependent countries such as Belize ideology may simply be a 
luxury: “in the modern world we live in today, each party has to have a mix of 
conservative principles and practices and labour-oriented – social-oriented – principles 
and practices” (2007). The primary differences and political arguments have therefore 
long been about how to best achieve Belize’s goals – and who is technically most able to 
achieve them - than about what the goals are. Accordingly, the forthcoming elections in 
2008 look likely to be fought over the ever-present issues of corruption, political reform 
and technical expertise at managing the economy. Bitterly fought and important though 
these issues will doubtless be, they are hardly ideological.  
 
Rather than fundamental ideological differences, the two issues that have 
perhaps most dominated Belizean politics over recent decades have been Central 
American immigration and the Guatemalan claim. The former is based on an oft-
perceived ethnic divide in the parties, whereby the PUP is supposedly at heart a Central 
American party catering for the mestizo Hispanic population while the UDP has its 
historical and geographical roots in the Afro-Belizean population, particularly in Belize 
City. Demographic shifts and immigration from war-torn Central America (and 
simultaneous creole emigration to the US) have exacerbated these ethnic tensions. There 
is, however, very little evidence thus far to suggest that different ethnic groups vote 
along ethnic lines; support for the parties has been almost equally split in both the 
predominantly mestizo areas of Orange Walk, Corozal and Toledo as well as in the 
principally creole Belize City. Nevertheless, there does remain a fear that at some future 
date Belizean racial divides could easily be exploited by power-hungry politicians. 
 
The issue of the Guatemalan territorial claim has caused rather more open and 
violent confrontation. At three points - in 1968 with the US-mediated Webster Proposals, 
in 1981 with the Heads of Agreement and in 1991 with the Maritime Areas Act – 
Belizeans reacted angrily and violently to even the merest hint of territorial concessions 
to Guatemala (Thorndike 1983, Shoman 1994a). Traditionally the NIP and then later, less 
doggedly, the UDP led and co-opted this popular reaction. Because the demonstrations 
were often led by Afro-Belizeans in Belize City (fiercely nationalistic and fearing for 
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their survival under potential Guatemalan rule) the issue has throughout been partially 
aligned with both the ethnic Afro-Mestizo divide and the UDP-PUP split. Nevertheless, 
there are signs that Belizeans are disinterested in politicians’ exploitation of the issue 
and increasingly assume that enough talented diplomats work behind the scenes to 
ensure that the issue will never again be a serious threat. Paul Morgan, Leader of the 
Vision Inspired by the People (VIP) Party, suggested that people were increasingly being 
turned off by the parties because “the Guatemala issue is being played as a football” by 
politicians (2007). 
 
What, then, can be made of the two dominant political parties? Clearly, the 
Westminster system is designed to thrive on artificial opposition. The concept of having 
an entrenched opposition holding the government to account, even when ideological 
differences are not that great, is central to the functioning of the House of 
Representatives. Nevertheless, the famous critique of the Westminster system in the 
Caribbean as formulated by the People’s Revolutionary Government of Grenada 
remains as relevant for Belize as ever: 
 
“We are insulted and we insult ourselves for as long as we continue to swallow 
the idea that where people are not divided into two camps facing each other across an 
imaginary line drawn by those in command, there is no democracy” (1981: 84). 
 
Indeed, the take of Belize’s own Left on the matter has been nearly as critical; 
Assad Shoman comments that “the role of the political parties, and of the party system, 
is to mediate between the dominators and the dominated, to give an illusion of popular 
autonomy, and to maintain a division of society along essentially irrelevant lines” (1987: 
89). In an era without the stark ideologies and visions of the Cold War, however, the 
PUP and UDP’s apparent convergence should hardly come as a surprise. What is 
worrying is how deeply politically polarised Belizean society is, even without these 
fundamental splits. The daily bitterness of the predominantly partisan media, combined 
with the viciousness of the parties’ rhetoric, makes for an uncompromising atmosphere 
in which daily life becomes remarkably politicised. As one interviewee remarked, 
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“whether you’re blue or red has nothing to do with the real issues of the day, but it 
becomes the most important thing” (Vernon 2007). 
 
1.4 Political patronage and clientelism 
This polarisation, however, is best understood as the result not only of the two-
party system but also of endemic clientelism and political patronage, neither of which 
show any signs of diminishing. First, resources – at both national and local level – are 
commonly distributed politically. For example, the UDP Council of Belize City 
complained earlier this year that funds were being delayed from reaching them by the 
central PUP government (Channel 5, 3rd July 2007). UDP representative Patrick Faber 
interpreted this approach as, “spiting the entire community simply because you want to 
play politics” (2007). Second, public shows of mass support also tend to be tainted with 
the brush of political patronage; the violent demonstrations in Belmopan against 
perceived corruption on 18th May 2007, according to the PUP, were made possible by the 
UDP paying for free buses in which their supporters were encouraged to descend upon 
the capital. Similarly, the 10,000 that were estimated to be at the National PUP Party 
Convention in Corozal (Amandala, 4th July 2007) were encouraged somewhat by the free 
transport, food and beer provided by the PUP party machine. Third, it is also allegedly a 
common practice for funds to be distributed by a victorious government to their own 
unelected candidates in each constituency. The candidate can then use these funds to 
garner support amongst his supporters ahead of the next election. The tradition of the 
weekly political clinic, supposedly to enhance the constituent-representative link, also 
still runs strong. But according to Patrick Faber, this tradition derives from the days of 
George Price, who was “the one who created that culture of every time you go to the 
Prime Minister’s office he gives you a little money in an envelope” (2007). While the 
UDP are probably correct in accusing the PUP of being better able to win votes through 
resources, this is, as UDP Chairman Doug Singh admitted, simply because “the party in 
power has a lot of resources so they can afford to do it more than we do. I think if we 
had more resources, we’d probably do it just as much” (2007).  
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There are three principal effects of this culture of patronage. First, liberal 
democracy’s concept of voters rationally choosing policies from a ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
is overshadowed by more immediate material concerns. Second, as Dylan Vernon, 
Director of the Katalyst Institute for Public Policy and Research, observed, “the entire 
state’s safety net welfare system is being undermined in a very un-transparent and 
unaccountable way” (2007). This threatens the provision of the very genuine and basic 
necessities (such as water, electricity, and school costs) that do exist. That the safety net 
for these kind of needs depends on one’s political allegiance clearly is not desirable. 
Third, and perhaps most significantly, it raises the stakes of political competition. In 
recent years the UDP has been characterised as a party prone to inciting civil 
disobedience and even violence. While this may not be true of the party’s leadership, 
UDP supporters at a grassroots level will inevitably go to great lengths to return their 
party to power. Paul Morgan explained the dangers inherent in this: 
 
“For the first time in this country, one set of beneficiaries are out in the cold for 
more than five years. And so it is getting desperate. They must win this time, otherwise 
there are dire consequences for their people” (2007). 
 
 
With people’s livelihoods depending on the candidate they support coming to 
power, the mobilisation and polarisation in Belizean politics and society becomes more 
understandable. What to outsiders appears as a politically interested electorate firmly 
endowed with democratic norms, under a closer cultural examination, turns out to be a 
population held in the grip of political parties, suspended permanently in a state of 
dependency. The people, of course, are as responsible as the parties for the perpetuation 
of a process of clientelism that is two-way. On an individual level, however, it may be 
unrealistic to expect any one voter, any more than any one politician, to sacrifice their 
interests by refraining from operating within and exploiting the existing system. In 
short, any attempt to break out of this cycle of patronage through political reform has to 
confront the question of causality. Patrick Faber, lamenting the example of one 
constituent who made continuous excessive demands and threatened not to vote for 
him, observed that “it continues because the people are the ones wishing it…it’s a 
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chicken and egg situation. Which do you fix first? Do you fix the politicians or do you fix 
the people?” (2007). 
 
1.5 Corruption 
Unlike clientelism, the issue of corruption has a particularly high profile in 
Belize. Since being included in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index in 2003, every successive year has seen a worsening of Belizeans’ perception of 
corruption (CPI Report 2003-2006). The prevalence of (mostly UDP) political posters and 
graffiti in visible public space decrying the PUP’s alleged corruption (with slogans such 
as ‘Pirates of the Caribbean’) may be a reflection of the growing sentiment that, as 
Patrick Faber put it, “the PUP are about creaming this country, raping this country of its 
resources and giving it to just a few” (2007). Daily stories and hearsay abound as to the 
fantastic mansions that PUP leaders are allegedly in the process of buying abroad. But 
such unsubstantiated rumours undoubtedly arise in part from the very real scandals of 
recent years.  
 
Particularly representative of the public’s concerns has been the outcry over the 
controversial policy of economic citizenship (giving citizenship to foreigners dependent 
on investment). As Paul Morgan put it, “when you sell your citizenship and don’t 
account for the money… you’re squandering it away, it’s like selling your children’s 
birth-home, and spending it on alcohol” (2007). In July 2002 a scandal was exposed in 
which top-level Immigration Department officials were accused of selling passports 
despite farcically completed applications. In the BELIPO scandal of October 2005  a 
prominent PUP Cabinet Minister, Godfrey Smith, was implicated in benefiting as an 
interested party in the sale of the Companies Registry, for which the Government 
inexplicably paid the stamp duty (Channel 5 News, 20th October 2005). Significantly, 
though his prospects as a potential future PUP leader may have been somewhat 
damaged, Smith emerged relatively unscathed. The affair, moreover, was indicative of a 
much broader feeling that the numerous privatisations of the 1990s and 2000s involved 
government politicians taking payments from the buyers.  
  
 
 
13 
 
The most recent scandal to erupt, in April 2007, which is at the time of writing in 
the courts, is that of the government guarantee for the indebted Universal Health 
Services (UHS). A guarantee loan of thirty three million dollars was signed by Prime 
Minister Said Musa and Attorney General Francis Fonseca without it passing the 
constitutional requirement of first going to the National Assembly. Though there are no 
indications that Musa personally benefited from the guarantee, the incompetence 
suggested by his later uncertainty over whether the amount was in US or Belizean 
dollars exacerbated the general crisis of confidence. In this environment of distrust, 
Godwin Hulse, an independent representing the local business community in the 
Senate, caught the national mood by suggesting that the politicians “need the whole of 
their bodies tied right now, not only their hands!” (2007). 
 
1.6 The political reform process 
Dylan Vernon, the Chairman of the Political Reform Commission, starkly 
observes that “our democracy is worse off now than it was in 1981” (2007). Facing this 
powerful cocktail of corruption, clientelism and artificial political division, the campaign 
for political reform has, over the last decade, gathered momentum. In March 1994 it was 
the Society for the Promotion of Education and Research (SPEAR), a prominent NGO, 
that led the calls for radical political reform. Two subsequent bi-partisan committees set 
up by the UDP government in November 1995 and June 1997, however, failed to make 
serious progress. It was only with the election of the PUP government in August 1998, 
partly on a mandate of reform, that the process culminated in the launch of a fourteen 
member independent Political Reform Commission, to which Prime Minister Said Musa 
suggested that no aspect of the Belizean political system should be treated as taboo or 
closed to inspection. Though the final report of the Political Reform Commission 
admitted that it did “not pretend to be the last word on political reform for Belize” 
(‘Final Report of the PRC’ 2000: 10), its in-depth analysis and exhaustive considerations 
recommended, amongst many other things: a unicameral legislature, election of the 
senate, increased independence of the judiciary and urgent review of campaign finance. 
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Above all, there was an emphasis on the need for political education, observing that 
“lack of awareness about Belize’s political system and political issues are significant 
constraints to people’s participation in Belize’s democracy and to making political 
reform really work” (2000: 135).  
 
Despite apparently having a genuine opportunity to effect changes, however, the 
(non-)implementation of many of the Commission’s key recommendations left much to 
be desired amongst the leaders of civil society organisations (Perera 2007, Vernon 2007). 
Dylan Vernon was particularly scathing about what was an “ad hoc approach, a band-
aid approach” (2007) to attempts at political reform, suggesting they had been “more 
cosmetic… than real in impact” and failed to get to the heart of the problems. This is not 
to suggest that the whole political reform process was fruitless; real advances, for 
example, were made in increasing the independence and efficiency of the judiciary. 
Moreover, as Vernon remarked, aside from tangible reforms, the process has had the 
unintended consequence of “increasing awareness of what people can achieve. And the 
very act of doing that, the process of doing that, was a democratic act in itself” (2007).  
 
The political reform debate will not, however, go away. The issue of an elected 
senate this year, for example, has come to the fore. And with the UDP recently releasing 
its programme for political reform, including a recall mechanism (enabling the mid-term 
removal of representatives) and campaign finance reform, the issue looks as though it 
will only become more politicised. At the same time, civil society organisations, with 
increasingly limited capacity and funding, have begun to tire – to the extent of “almost 
putting a moratorium on political reform for a while” (Vernon 2007) - of pressing home 
a message that falls on the deaf, self-serving ears of political parties hungry only for the 
immediate votes that piecemeal promises of political reform seem to ensure. 
Nevertheless, while the immediate future may offer disappointment for those who 
charge themselves with reforming Belize’s political system, it is the gradual act of raising 
political consciousness which may be the most important, and yet unintended, effect of 
the reform process. As Vernon concluded, “people are at a higher level of understanding 
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[of] what Belize’s problems are now, and … that’s attributable to the whole political 
reform process” (2007).  
 
1.7 The limits of a procedural interpretation 
Alma Young is not alone in noting that in Belize “there are two political parties, 
there has been electoral turnover in office, legislation is crafted by an elected body, and 
there is popular interest and participation in the political arena” (1994: 113). One 
particularly influential work in the 1980s placed Belize firmly in the context of war-torn 
Central America, warning that “the Belizean domino… could topple without energetic 
and well-directed support from the United States and other industrial countries” 
(Fernandez 1989: vi). Fernandez therefore argued that leaders should be quick to 
promote “an enviable track record as a stable democracy in a region of insurrections, 
revolutions, and wars of national liberation” (1989: 96), thus deploying the concept of 
democracy not only as a tool for economic development, but also as an indicator of just 
which side Belize was on in the Cold War.  
 
But even for those who disagree with positive conclusions about the state of 
Belizean democracy and emphasise instead the decay outlined above, the approach has 
nevertheless tended to be one of how to reduce the gap and best implement the global 
formulae for good governance. Crucially, the assumptions which persist about the 
procedural nature of democracy derive not from the Belizean experience but from 
externally imposed models. That Belize has experienced enormous circular migration 
with the United States, retains British colonial links, and as a small dependent country is 
exposed to global models has made Belizeans likely to adopt such a definition. In 
interviews with the author, in citing the shortcomings of Belizean democracy, prominent 
actors referenced countless times the UK or US systems as an ideal benchmark of 
democratic governance.  
 
It is suggested here that the prevailing definition of democracy as a set of 
procedures, universally applicable to individual situations, is unhelpful by itself in 
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understanding the Belizean experience because it does not account for longer-term 
processes and experiences that are culturally and historically specific (Chabal & Daloz 
2006; Whitehead 2002; Wydra 2007). Such a model, moreover, ignores the normative and 
legitimising impact of democracy and is therefore “insufficient, because it excludes the 
inescapable teleological component of democracy which is what gives it emotional 
force” (Whitehead 2002: 10). As Whitehead writes, “’democracy’ is best understood not 
as a pre-determined end-state, but as a long-term and somewhat open-ended outcome, 
not just as a feasible equilibrium but as a socially desirable and imaginary future” (2002: 
3). Belize, then, for too long has held its democracy up against an illusory, externally-
derived benchmark and failed to appreciate that in fact democracy is as much a work of 
consciousness creating imaginary utopian futures as it is a mere political system. 
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2 Towards an interpretive approach 
 
“Believing with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to 
be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search 
of meaning”.  
 
Clifford Geertz, 1973: 5. 
 
To begin to approach a question of politics from the perspective of an 
anthropologist is no accidental mistake. “The only justification for what we do,” Patrick 
Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz remind us, “other than to construct models in the air, is to 
further the understanding of political processes across the world” (2006: 27). Method, in 
short, is but a means to an end. As Eric Voegelin once wrote of political science’s 
tendency towards positivism, “science is a search for truth concerning the nature of the 
various realms of being. Relevant in science is whatever contributes to the success of this 
search” (1952: 4-5). With this in mind, an interpretive approach is suggested. As 
Laurence Whitehead outlines, “instead of seeking to understand large historical 
processes such as democratisation by procedures aimed at suppressing all elements of 
subjectivity and perspective on the part of the analyst, and all nuance and complexity in 
the object of analysis, the narrative approach requires the conscious and trained 
deployment of all these resources” (2002: 248). The art of interpretation, then, is 
necessarily imprecise. And yet, despite being so, it offers the potential to illuminate the 
processes of Belizean history and democracy by virtue of placing the country’s cultural 
and historical specificity at centre-stage. Belize, however, with its democratic-
constitutionalism-within-a-colonial-framework, is no clear-cut case of democratisation 
complete with obvious critical junctures (such as, for example, Latin America or Eastern 
Europe). If, as Harald Wydra writes, “democratic aspirations result from the historical 
creativity of transformative experiences” (2007: 277), then where are these to be found in 
Belizean history, given the superficial appearance of political continuity? 
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2.1 The labour movement and the emergence of nationalism 
The growth of the nationalist movement, and in particular the People’s United 
Party, has previously been attributed primarily to the devaluation of the British 
Honduran dollar by the British colonial government in 1949 (Grant 1976). As Shoman 
acknowledges, the decision certainly had a catalytic effect; “the wretched conditions 
under which people had lived hitherto had been gradually worsening over decades, but 
now here was an act which by a shake of the pen visibly and dramatically aggravated 
their situation” (1979: 46). Nigel Bolland, however, argues that the genesis of 
nationalism can be found much further back in the labour disturbances of the 1930s 
(1988, 2001). After the riots of 1919, in which demobilised soldiers returning from the 
First World War protested against their perceived mistreatment, there was an 
unmistakeable mood of discontent. When in the 1930s the already-strained market for 
mahogany and forest produce collapsed amid the effects of the global depression, 
unemployment rose dramatically. In 1931, Hurricane Hattie devastated British 
Honduras, leaving a (proportionally massive) 1,000 dead (Bolland 1988). Despite these 
ever-worsening conditions, the colonial authorities were able to offer relief work for 
only 150 people.  
 
By 1934, the masses of unemployed began to organise. At the fore of the self-
styled ‘Unemployed Brigade’, later to become the Labour and Unemployed Association 
(LUA), was the militant Antonio Soberanis Gomez. According to Peter Ashdown, 
Soberanis “in his somewhat incoherent but messianic and vociferous speeches… called 
for the institution of a fair wage and work for the unemployed and he attacked Crown 
Colony government, imperial neglect of Belize and colonial officialdom” (1978: 63). 
Bolland observes, though, that the effects of the militants’ rhetoric were far-reaching; 
“while the labourers made specific demands for relief and a minimum wage, these 
demands were couched in broad moral and political terms that began to define and 
develop a new nationalistic and democratic political culture in Belize” (1988: 164). 
Specifically the demands also created an unprecedented space of protest for the labour 
movement, with labour reforms and the legalisation of trade unions in 1941. In 1943, 
penal sanctions were finally removed for breach of contract, meaning that workers could 
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add to their legal arsenal of protest the weapon of labour strikes. Accordingly, in 1943 
the influential General Workers’ Union (GWU) was registered, which “more than any 
other organisation” went on to raise “the political consciousness of the working people 
in the 1940s” (Bolland 2001: 631). 
 
Soberanis, however, may have been more than willing to hand over the reins of 
the developing nationalist movement to more intellectual individuals (Ashdown 1978). 
But those who came to the fore were from a decidedly business-oriented elite. Amongst 
others, the self-made chicle millionaire Robert S. Turton – who later sponsored and 
encouraged his employee George Price to lead the PUP – promised to look at the 
employment question when elective principles were reintroduced in 1936. According to 
Ashdown, they “overnight became the ‘people’s men’” (1978: 71). When the People’s 
Committee, the precursor to the People’s United Party, was formed in 1950 it quickly 
and effortlessly co-opted the momentum of the GWU, taking over leadership of the 
nationalist movement. But “although the PUP relied on the GWU to win the first 
national elections, it eschewed class politics as well as ethnic politics, developing instead 
a typical populist party of national unity” (Bolland 2001: 653). The intellectuals to which 
Soberanis and others in the labour movement had relinquished control, then, tempered 
the potential radicalism of the nationalist working class movement, aware that allowing 
it to develop to its natural conclusion would be dangerous, because after all the “anger 
of the working class was not just directed towards the Colonial Government but also 
towards the mercantile elite and privileged classes to which they themselves belonged” 
(Ashdown 1978: 69).  
 
“The independence movement in general, and the PUP in particular, grew out of 
this labour movement, which”, as Bolland observes, “had been developing for 16 years 
before devaluation” (2001: 633). As an invigorating, participatory democratic experience 
the labour movements were therefore cut short, in some sense betrayed by the middle-
class business orientation of the populist PUP. As Shoman puts it, it was hardly 
surprising that while the PUP “could have moved in the direction of true democracy… 
sometime around 1960 it became just another rock and roll band, seeking 
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accommodation with the British and with the local middle class and bourgeoisie, with 
the result that it became mildly reformist rather than revolutionary, and that the real 
decolonisation process invoking radical cultural change was stopped in its tracks” 
(1994b: 10). In the context of a creative transformative experience, shaping the meaning 
of democracy, the labour movements promised much but ultimately delivered little. As 
Ashdown concludes with reference to Antonio Soberanis, “it is perhaps ironic that the 
practice of ‘democracy’ in action removed the last vestiges of support from the only true 
democrat in the 1930s” (1978: 71).  
 
 
2.2 ‘The crowd called UBAD’: radicalising democracy 
As V.S. Naipaul wrote in 1969, PUP dominance in this supposed peripheral 
backwater could not remain unchallenged forever. “The world”, he observed, “intrudes. 
The sons of people once content with the Premier’s benediction go away to study and 
come back and curse both parties. They talk of Vietnam and Black Power. They 
undermine the Negro loyalty to the slave past” (1969: 217). Three such returning 
students were Evan Hyde, Assad Shoman and Said Musa. Returning from a scholarship-
funded university education in the USA, Hyde espoused an uncompromising Black 
Power message, forming the United Black Association for Development (UBAD). But 
while the spiritual return of ‘Afro-Hondurans’ to their African roots, as opposed to the 
mimicry of white customs and values to which they were apparently accustomed, 
remained central to Hyde’s vision (1995), it was the inclusive definition of black that 
made his vision palatable to other Belizeans. Black, he argued, was not only about skin 
colour but also a state of mind, historically determined by one’s exposure to forms of 
oppression. As he wrote in his seminal piece ‘Knocking Our Own Ting’ in 1969, 
describing attitudes towards his critique of the foundation myth of the Battle of St. 
George’s Caye in 1798, “if you are black you think like me. If you’re high brown you 
think like the Loyal and Patriotic Order of the Baymen. If you’re white, you couldn’t 
have read so far. You must be thinking black” (Hyde 1995: 17).  
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While Hyde has been extensively criticised - both by his opponents in the PUP 
for being guilty of black racism and more recently for reinforcing male chauvinism 
(Macpherson 2007a; 2007b) – it was this broad and instinctive approach to radical 
struggle which made possible his links to the more class-orientated Shoman and Musa. 
On 4th May 1969 the Belize Billboard interviewed Assad Shoman as a member of UBAD, 
though according to Hyde he had in fact only ever been a guest speaker (Hyde 1995). In 
the interview, Shoman adopted a similar line of thought to emphasise the common goals 
of the radical movement: 
 
“By ‘black’ we mean non-white, and as applied specifically to our country it 
means the so-called Spanish Latin, the so-called Creole, Carib, Mayan, Arab, Chinese, 
Indians, Mestizos. We consider all these people, of different races, but to a large extent 
inter-mixed, as one people, who must unite to present a solid front against the imperialist 
which is based in the USA” (1995: 5-6). 
 
 
This tension – between the broadly cultural aims of Hyde’s UBAD and the 
political and socioeconomic emphasis given to the struggle by Shoman and Musa – 
existed throughout the loose coalition between the two elements. Shoman and Musa 
who, with Lionel del Valle,  had formed the Political Action Committee (PAC) to apply a 
socialist dependency analysis to political matters in Belize, needed access to the kind of 
popular, mobilised support that only Hyde was able to arouse in Belize City, the centre 
of Afro-Honduran identity politics. Nevertheless, while these differences between 
cultural and political aims never disappeared, and in fact ultimately resulted in the two 
elements drifting apart, the marriage of convenience – at its closest in October 1969 
when UBAD and PAC merged to form the Revolitical Action Movement (RAM) – was 
nevertheless able to captivate its Belizean audience. After a while, as Hyde put it, 
“everything bad became UBAD” (1995: 40).  
 
UBAD, PAC and RAM were important perhaps more for the critique they 
offered rather than their proximity to the centres of power. When UBAD finally, after 
the breakdown of the RAM merger, formed the ‘UBAD Party for Freedom, Justice and 
Equality’, only Evan X Hyde stood as a candidate. He proved unable to break the 
political parties’ grip on power, winning just 89 votes in the Collett constituency and 
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soon after removing himself “from the political spotlight” (Hyde 1995: 101). But the 
radicalisation of the concept of democracy remained; the cry of Amandala, an African 
word for ‘people power’, though now with more than a touch of bitter irony about it, 
still resonates. As Shoman had put it back in 1969, “we believe in the People’s power 
and that this is the true definition of democracy. This has no relation to the kind of 
democracy that they speak about so often for that is sheer hypocrisy, not democracy” 
(1995: 4).  
 
UBAD’s legacy, however, may be more than an astute critique of Belizean party 
politics. Musa and Shoman were both brought into the PUP by George Price and have 
been responsible for maintaining and emphasising its social justice credentials. Musa, 
while his current government may seem rather distant from the aims of PAC and RAM, 
has nevertheless been able to guide Belize in a direction that is doubtless shaped in part 
by his personal experiences of the 1960s and 1970s. Shoman, meanwhile, has continued 
to exert a strong influence behind the scenes, as well as being largely responsible for the 
international developments that made Belize’s independence possible. Hyde, for his 
part, has hardly withdrawn from the political scene entirely; as well as reneging on his 
earlier hatred of the PUP, he has also remained an influential voice in Belize. The UBAD 
newspaper Amandala has gone on to be the best-selling paper and offers a rare non-
partisan perspective. KREM Radio, also set up by Hyde, has similarly ensured that 
although institutionalised and much transformed, UBAD’s voice has not been entirely 
silenced.  
 
But tangible effects aside, there is no reason to think that the transformative 
experience of the radical politics of the 1960s and 1970s will be easily forgotten in the 
collective Belizean memory. The culmination came, importantly, in the state’s attempted 
repression of the radical movement. Following an article entitled Games Old People Play, 
Ismail Shabazz and Hyde were put on trial by the PUP government for sedition. Here 
seemed to be the colonial government using, as Shoman put it, “the courts as a cover-up 
for what is really political repression” (1995: 269). In the trial in July 1970 that captured 
the imagination of the country, the stakes could not have been higher. As Shoman, 
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providing pro bono legal defence with Musa, told the jury: “you will decide whether 
you will assume responsibility for the extermination of all voices of dissent, or whether 
you will go down in history as having upheld the freedom of dissent that, we are told, is 
an integral part of so-called Christian Democracy” (1995: 269). To the delight of the 
crowds packed into the squares outside the courthouse, the jury acquitted Shabazz and 
Hyde. Shoman and Musa, their political stock never higher, were carried on the 
shoulders of the people. As Anne Macpherson writes, “it was a moment at which 
political culture in Belize seemed to be changing dramatically, when healthy elements of 
substantive criticism were added to that culture” (Shoman 1995: 265).  
2.3 A dependent independence? 
In the attempt to build the “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) of the 
nation, the occasion of independence should have offered Belize the opportunity to 
cement new allegiances through the creation of symbols and shared histories. In 1981, 
however, the Guatemalan issue came to overshadow the entire affair. The 1979 elections, 
according to Shoman, centred around the issue of independence: 
 
“Many observers expected the UDP to win, since there was growing 
dissatisfaction with the economic situation… … The UDP campaigned on the platform 
that independence should be delayed for at least ten years… … The PUP, recognising its 
weakness in other areas, based its campaign squarely on the early attainment of 
independence… … The elections were, in effect, a referendum on whether or not Belize 
should proceed to independence as soon as possible” (1994a: 231). 
 
The PUP, unexpectedly, got their victory by 13 seats to 5. But the split along 
party lines now reflected – or rather, had manufactured – a division over the issue of 
independence. This fed into predominantly ethnic concerns over the PUP government’s 
attitude towards the Guatemala issue. Afro-Belizeans in particular feared that the Heads 
of Agreement (in which the PUP attempted to guarantee Belize’s security by offering 
Guatemala permanent and unimpeded access to the sea and the use of certain cayes in 
exchange for earlier recognition of Belize’s sovereignty) constituted a sell-out by a pro-
Hispanic party. The fact that the country was divided, at least loosely, along both party 
and ethnic lines over the issue of independence - to the extent of the rioting and national 
crisis that came before 21st September 1981 – left a rather bitter taste in the Belizean 
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mouth. Perhaps worse, it meant that the foundation myth for the postcolonial state of 
Belize was one of division, disunity and moderate violence. That the British had 
accepted and welcomed the idea of Belizean independence for almost twenty years 
before it finally happened, moreover, meant that the anti-colonial movement did not 
culminate in the defeat of a common enemy, but rather entailed kindly requesting the 
former colonial master for a defence guarantee as he willingly withdrew. 
 
Independence also failed to represent a break with the past through an end to 
dependency. The realisation around the rest of the Anglophone Caribbean years before 
that formal independence hardly equated to actual independence - or to a less 
peripheral position in global capitalism - did not, in certain circles, take all that long to 
sink in. Assad Shoman concluded of independence that “ordinary Belizeans today have 
no more control over their natural resources, no more power to decide their economic 
and social policies, than they did before independence” (1994a: 236). In 1991 the Society 
for the Promotion of Education and Research (SPEAR) produced a report, the product of 
a conference, entitled ‘Ten Years After Independence’, in which the changes – and more 
importantly the continuities – between 1981 and 1991 were discussed in depth. 
 
Independence, then, took on the appearance of a lost opportunity. While the 
labour movement of the 1930s and then the radical movement of the 1960s and 1970s 
had both represented, in some sense, a popular attempt to redefine the discourse of 
democracy (though not primarily presented in this way), independence in 1981 was not 
so much the betrayal or co-optation of a popular attempt as a foundational moment that 
Belize’s diplomatic history contrived to deprive of much meaning. Like the labour 
demonstrations and UBAD movement before, it was far from the democratic transition 
that optimists might once have hoped that it could be. 
 
2.4 Reclaiming a history of popular resistance 
History in Belize, as Shoman argues, has tended to be written and owned by 
(neo)colonial elites and used as an instrument of ethnic division. In recent decades, 
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however, real attempts have been made to reclaim Belizean history; in 1994, for example, 
SPEAR organised a conference entitled ‘People’s Resistance and Social Change in 
Belize’. One example of moderate success in re-imagining Belize’s history as one of 
popular resistance was the controversial debunking of the myth of the Battle of St. 
George’s Caye, which Evan X Hyde had described as “the most effective historical 
source of division between the tribes in our society” (1995: 1). Celebrated on September 
10th each year, the Battle of St. George’s Caye in 1798 was the moment when the white 
colonial Baymen of British Honduras, against all the odds, defeated a Spanish fleet off 
the coast of Belize City. This turned out to be the foundation myth of British Honduras 
as a British colony, with the Spanish never to re-assert their claim.  
 
According to the (white) authors of the original myth, the black slaves willingly 
fought as free men alongside their white masters and it was their support that was 
decisive in winning the battle. Such a myth, it was argued, cemented the slaves’ 
allegiance to the British over the Spanish and gave them a central role in the imagined 
future of British Honduras. It was, however, a rather dubious role in which their loyalty 
as subordinates – whether to slave masters or, later, to colonial employers - was 
promoted as a desirable characteristic on which their symbolic importance in the nation 
rested. According to Macpherson, the authors effectively “asserted their white male 
ancestors’ command of loyal male slaves as a metaphor of their own ability to lead and 
control the Creole working class, and thus of their fitness to legislate” (2003: 109). 
Moreover, the myth glorified Belize’s slavery, which – along with a pride in the logging 
camps over the sugar plantations that had been present elsewhere – had the effect of 
inaccurately portraying the Belizean experience of slavery as considerably less arduous 
than in other Anglophone Caribbean countries. Finally, the myth used the idea of a 
degree of social mobility to divide Afro-Belizean unity, suggesting that by putting on 
Fanon’s ‘white mask’, the ‘high brown’ (to use Hyde’s phrase) could escape the poverty 
and neglect otherwise associated with their skin colour.   
 
The debunking of the St. George’s Caye myth is no longer as controversial as it 
once was. Neither, perhaps, are the attempts to revise the British history of Mayan 
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resistance, promoting rebellion leaders like Marcos Canul in 1872 not as uncivilised 
savages but as heroes of the anti-imperialist struggle. Nor, for that matter, is the search 
to uncover “the countless ways in which slaves resisted slavery; not only by escapes and 
revolts, but in their day-to-day practice by which they signified their rejection of their 
status and proclaimed their humanity through their cultural practices, legal challenges, 
petitions, demonstrations, work stoppages and yes, even assassinations and suicides” 
(Shoman 1994b: 6). But more recent academic works have also drawn attention to the 
continuities of resistance and struggle in wage labour. Despite the lack of collective 
resistance or labour organisation thus far among workers in the banana industry, Mark 
Moberg prefers to emphasise the culture of resistance that nevertheless persists on an 
individual level; “despite the fact that farmowners manipulate ethnic and national 
loyalties to control labour, their goal of a docile workforce remains elusive… … Through 
sabotage, theft, and foot-dragging…banana workers continue to exact a high toll on the 
productivity and profits of export agriculture” (1994: 3).  
 
Perhaps most important, though, is the recent work done to recover a gendered 
history of Belize. Much ignored in previous histories of Belize (e.g. Dobson 1973, Grant 
1976), there have now been more successful attempts to redress this imbalance and to 
emphasise a gendered analysis (Macpherson 2003, 2007a, 2007b; Shoman 1994b). One 
recent volume explores the role that women played in twentieth century politics, 
suggesting that both the female middle-class reformers within the political system, and 
those radical labour activists outside of it, made different contributions to an inherently 
male-dominated system. As Macpherson concludes, “their combined record of 
pressuring the state from within and without, and their common experience of 
becoming hostages to party politics and the national question, provide Belizeans – 
especially the women’s movement, which has faltered since the 1990s – with critical 
lessons and tools for confronting the challenges of the past and present” (2007b: 284). 
Though there will undoubtedly be much more to be said on the subject, it is the attempt 
to outline a historical role of struggle for women in Belize that is most relevant here. 
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These combined efforts interpret Belizean history as a combination of oppression 
and resistance. In the attempt to outline a past culture of people power, historians have 
suggested that the oppressive colonial and post-colonial experiences existed alongside a 
popular reaction against them.  This dissertation, however, argues that instead of 
understanding oppression and resistance as mutually interacting opposites, democracy 
should be seen as having its roots in the oppression, exploitation and incivility of the colonial 
and post-colonial experiences. While the movements outlined here were doubtless 
important for the popular resistance that they embodied, their true significance is as 
potentially transformative moments in which Belizean democracy could have been re-
imagined. As suggested, however, the labour movement, radical movement, and 
independence all failed to actually lead to significant democratic change. Each, in its 
own way, fell short and neither destroyed the moral order of the colonial way of life, nor 
replaced it with a different, democratic approach valuing civility, tolerance and equality. 
In spite of this, there remains the possibility that a future possible transformation, a 
future democratic awakening, may yet take place.  
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3 A “miracle in progress in Belize”? 
 
3.1 Civil society 
Rather like democracy, the conceptualisation of civil society is potentially of the 
utmost importance to Belize. One perspective would highlight civil society as an 
associative arena in which non-political entities operate, creating the effect of a 
counterbalance to political society. In this pluralist model, the existence of depoliticised 
interests is seen as ensuring that not all in society will become subject to totalitarian or 
utopian political visions. In much of European history, the bourgeoisie became equated 
with civil society and has therefore been seen as playing a role in bringing about 
democratisation. But as Andrew Levin points out, “the composition of civil society must 
be acknowledged to be historically contingent and variable” (11:1995: 405) because 
elsewhere in the world “the bourgeoisie has more often than not been allied with and 
protected by the repressive governments resisting democratisation. Other forces have 
led the fight for democratisation, and this has resulted in a different notion of civil 
society, the democratisation process, and ultimately, of democracy itself” (Levin 1995: 
404). The role of a broader, less quantifiable civil society in recent democratisation 
processes, from Poland to Haiti, has led to the recognition that it must be 
reconceptualised. Previous interpretations simply no longer universally explain these 
experiences. There is, as Levin observes, “an often unknowing reliance on the 
comfortable old notion of civil society as the private realm centred in the free market. 
Much of the confusion results from attempts to apply this historically specific, two-
hundred-year-old European model to situations it simply does not fit” (1995: 441).  
 
Perhaps more useful is a definition of civil society in which ‘civility’ is central. 
Pivotal transformations of political society from un-civil to civil, in this sense, require 
institutional reform to create changes in norms and values. Crucially, however, they 
would also rely upon the contingent consequences of unexpected events and 
experiences which simply cannot be predicted or deliberately brought about. 
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Importantly, modernity, as well as the concomitant state-society relations of 
totalitarianism, authoritarianism and intolerance, may all be prerequisites for a 
subsequent opportunity to foster a transformation of consciousness. In other words, 
only after the possibilities opened up by modernity have been exhausted and rejected 
can they be deliberately overcome; “the [previous] inability of the state to penetrate 
social life is not at all the same thing as the creation of social practices which make state-
society interactions civilised” (Hall 1995: 4).  
 
Under this interpretation, civil society is inextricably linked to the civilising 
process of democratisation, where democracy is not so much an outcome as an act or 
process of meaning transformation in the direction of civility. Where democracy consists 
of this civilising process, a ‘civil society’ is clearly a central component. As Wydra 
writes, “if there is an ‘essence’ to democracy, then it can be the question about what 
makes people denounce claims to total power, resist despotic and unaccountable rule, 
and submit decision processes about legitimate power to the scrutiny of public opinion 
and the ensuing act of voting” (2007: 280). Moreover, such a denunciation must 
necessarily involve a transformation from something to something else. In other words, 
“the civilising process needs to engage with situations that liberal democratic theory and 
much of comparative politics would consider coterminous with the failure of 
consolidation” (Wydra 2007: 278). Democracy, as a civilising process, is born under 
conditions of authoritarianism; in Belize, under colonial and neo-colonial forms of rule.  
 
Civil society, or rather ‘civilising society’, is central to democratisation. It should 
no longer be restricted to a depoliticised role, as developments in the latest global wave 
of democratic transitions have made clear. Indeed, the assertion by democratisation 
theorists that the term democratic consolidation should increasingly include changes in 
norms and values may be a sign that ‘civil society’ is, though in a rather different sense, 
being acknowledged as a major factor in democratisation. As Levin observes, “of 
particular interest is the role the revival of civil society has played in this embrace of 
democratic process as a core value. Scholars who want to cabin democracy within the 
political sphere have overlooked this development. In missing this dynamic aspect of 
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civil society, they fail to see the tremendous implications of civil society for democratic 
theory as a whole” (1995: 403). The argument, then, is that understanding modern 
processes of democratisation requires developing the concept of both a politicised civil 
society but also, simultaneously, a civilised, depoliticised ‘democracy’. 
 
By broadening the definition of civil society, the possible futures for Belizean 
society may be better understood. Thus far, however, ‘civil society’ has tended to be 
interpreted according to the dominant, though rather unhelpful, definition of associative 
organisations; usually referring to civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) or the unions. With the NGO Act of December 2000, the 
partnership between Belizean NGOs and the government was institutionalised. This 
partnership derives principally from what Gustavo Perera, Executive Director of SPEAR, 
described as “the global model of governance”, referring primarily to the idea of a 
“tripartite partnership between government, civil society and the private sector – civil 
society representing more the people and broader population” (2007). But while some 
CSOs, such as SPEAR and the Katalyst Institute for Public Policy and Research, 
undoubtedly do their utmost to represent the interests of the Belizean population, to 
restrict ‘civil society’ to these organisations or, worse yet, other less representative 
associative organisations such as environmental NGOs or the unions, would be to adopt 
an unhelpfully narrow, restricting and increasingly meaningless definition. Laurence 
Whitehead argues that, 
 
“NGOs tend to lack the surrounding ethos, the sense of authenticity, and the 
spirit of autonomy celebrated by theorists of civil society. They cannot be relied upon 
either to stand together or to constrain the excesses of authoritarian power, as civil society 
enthusiasts would wish. Nor do NGOs necessarily have the well-structured community 
support that civil society would claim to possess. If civil society is to play the role of 
primum mobile in the long-run processes of democratisation, it must be more than a cluster 
of NGOs” (2002: 68). 
 
 
3.2 A new Belizean awakening 
Belizean NGOs, despite their valuable work, have clear limitations. While now 
having a seat at most policymaking tables – Witter opines that “in this sense Belize is 
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further ahead in CARICOM in formally instituting relations between civil society 
organisations and the government” (2007: 20) – the question of how influential they can 
be remains uncertain. As part of the political reform process the PUP designated three 
seats in the Senate for independent sectors (one each for civil society, business and the 
Church). But while this enables some monitoring of legislation, these Senators remain 
otherwise outnumbered and impotent. The place given to CSOs and NGOs, therefore, in 
policymaking remains “totally advisory in nature” (Vernon 2007) and apparently more 
of a token nod in the direction of global governance models than a real re-imagination of 
state-society relations.  
 
 NGOs, in any event, have an extremely limited capacity. Funding, of course, is a 
major issue; the giddy days of Belize being an anti-communist island in Central 
America, with all the associated US funding, have been succeeded by an era in which 
Africa and Iraq have taken centre-stage. But, according to Dylan Vernon, there is also a 
minor leadership crisis caused by burnout; “these people have too much to do. I mean, 
they’re doing everything… there’s always people expecting you to do more, to lead, to 
do this, to do that” (2007). In a climate in which political parties are seen, at least partly, 
as preying on the Belizean voters, some NGOs are increasingly taking on by default the 
responsibility of representing the people. Such a burden is understandably 
overwhelming for organisations typically staffed only by a few people. That NGOs 
should seek to effect change through accommodation with government, then, rather 
than confrontation is hardly surprising in these circumstances.  
 
A broadened active civil society, beyond simply NGOs and CSOs, defies easy 
categorisation. As suggested above, the concept cannot be pinned down, unfortunately 
for the analyst, to any one type of associative entity or organisation. But in Belize, it can 
be found today in a number of loose manifestations. Efforts to increase accountability, 
for example, can be found in the Belize Covenant Movement, launched by Derek 
Aikman on July 1st 2007. Despite attracting only 127 people (because of accidentally 
clashing with the PUP National Party Convention) it promised, albeit with rather 
religious overtones, to “keep watch with the angels, the stars and the moon” over 
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Belizean politics (The Independent Reformer, 27th July 2007). Around 2002, Godwin 
Hulse was involved in the movement calling itself ‘We the People’, which began by 
monitoring government legislation closely, before splitting over the issue of whether to 
run as a political party.  
 
The Belizean media, traditionally either government-owned or highly partisan, is 
showing signs of increasing independence. While Amandala and The Reporter remain the 
only papers with a significant circulation not affiliated to a party, it is the increasing, 
though as yet partial, independence of the radio and television channels that is 
beginning to provide Belizeans with more reliable news sources and challenging 
analysis. In particular, the popular morning talk shows – especially on Love FM but on 
other radio and television stations as well – have provided an unlikely avenue for 
popular discontent, and deserve further research. Though the views aired can be 
uninformed and highly opinionated, talk shows can contribute not only to the debate 
over a prominent topic, but also towards gathering momentum around a controversial 
issue (such as the UHS guarantee earlier this year). As Dylan Vernon observed, “if you 
are a politician [then] anything [in] the media said about you negatively or positively 
more than once, twice, ten times, becomes an issue” (2007). Finally, the age of 
communications will continue to have some clear effects. Internet and online blogs are 
becoming increasingly influential as a cheap, easy and quick way to facilitate the spread 
of ideas. One example is Xanthe TV, an independent TV company established by, Edwin 
Colon, a young Belizean from the United States, which hopes to provide a forum for 
tech-savvy Belizeans to express themselves. Xanthe Films, a sister company, hopes to 
establish an independent Belizean film industry. Tellingly, a trailer for the forthcoming 
documentary, ‘Fahrenheit Belize’, pertinently asks of the country’s politics and society: 
“where is the unity?” 
 
Some sectors of society, moreover, are increasingly realising their power. One is 
the business sector. Doug Singh argued not only that they were “actually taking stronger 
stands than they’ve ever taken” but that the strength of independent sectors like 
business, civil society and the unions “depends on [this] ability to be active” (2007). But 
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perhaps the two greatest areas of empowerment for citizens today are civil protest and 
the vote. Dylan Vernon commented that “the space that has become most effective is the 
space of civil protest. That’s where you see governments actually making changes to 
things that people are pissed off about”. Moreover, with few other avenues open, 
“changes in governments are one of the few real tangible tools, weapons, that the voters 
have to send messages. And because of that, then it should be used” (2007). While 
elections, however, remain rare moments of expression, it is demonstrations, go-slow 
days at work, and more general manifestations of civil protest that are becoming a 
principal channel for discontent. Of course, the opposition inevitably will seek to co-opt 
and lead civil protest wherever it is at all directed against the government in power, and 
maintaining the independence of the civil movement when the party stranglehold is so 
strong will be difficult.  
 
There are, however, signs that such discontent with the dominance of the two 
parties is growing. In October 2005 a SPEAR poll found that 49% of Belizeans would 
vote for a third party, and one newspaper editorial saw this and a string of subsequent 
polls as strong evidence for the viability of a third party (Amandala, 14th December 
2006). But while party popularity is difficult to measure, the hope for third party leaders 
like Paul Morgan is that the new forms of communication and independent movements 
will help to turn these uncertain and unquantifiable expressions of discontent into 
something rather more concrete: 
 
“lately there seems to be a miracle in progress in Belize. I do believe that it is a 
modern-day miracle. I have never seen developments in the political arena so fast…Day 
by day, action that is going on here. I have never seen parties that were so dominant be 
braced like this because of actions that they really can’t control…begging, both of them 
begging from all corners. To me, it is a miracle in progress that only the Belizean voter 
can finish” (2007). 
 
 
A ‘miracle’, of course, may be an exaggeration. But, as Dylan Vernon pointed 
out, even should both the PUP and UDP retain their grasp on electoral politics, “the 
aftermath of elections will result in some changes away from some of the problems that 
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were there before to some hope. And one of these times people have to spring on that 
hope and move it to another level” (2007). 
 
3.3 A socially grounded narrative: conceptualising democracy     
That these voices of dissent exist in Belize is certain. But it is less certain just what 
effect they may have. As already outlined, other more co-ordinated and coherent 
movements in Belizean history have failed to have their desired impact. Nevertheless, if 
a truly democratising process is to occur in Belize it must begin from contesting 
previously held assumptions, beliefs and myths. Such a contestation over the concept of 
democracy has the potential to highlight areas of commonality amongst this diverse 
nascent movement and increase the chances that, unlike efforts in the past, it will not be 
still-born. Deconstructing the concept, moreover, is more than an exercise in 
unnecessary theory. As Whitehead observes, “deliberation arises not because of 
reasoning from first principles, or due to the creation of artificial institutions, but 
because it becomes necessary in order to tackle social needs” (2002: 25). 
 
Of course, the danger in deconstructing and contesting the dominant 
interpretation of democracy is that any number of differing interpretations has the 
potential to fill the vacuum. It is, “in principle… evidently possible that more than one 
imagined future may occupy popular consciousness at one time” (Whitehead 2002: 33). 
In this potential abyss of cultural relativism, it is theoretically possible for numerous 
unpalatable interpretations of democracy to surface. Indeed, Belizean culture may be 
immersed so deeply in colonial understandings that they too will undoubtedly influence 
the interpretation that arises, and cannot be dismissed in any sense as less authentic. But 
as Whitehead makes clear, where it is the popular movement reinventing democracy, 
there remains an in-built protection against the pitfalls of relativism: 
 
“To persuade the community to take an unfamiliar interpretation of democracy 
seriously it will be necessary to parade a variety of credentials – clear logic, good 
evidence, familiarity with the culture, and a reputation for a sound judgment may all be 
needed to pierce the defensive barrier of conventional thinking. Sometimes abusive 
claims may succeed, and on other occasions potentially ‘valid’ interpretations may fail to 
pass the test… But the critical point for our purposes is that this deliberative filter 
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constitutes a major socially grounded protection against the destruction of meaning and 
value that would otherwise accompany the contestability of concepts” (2002: 22). 
 
 
Belizeans, therefore, should have the faith and confidence that their own people 
will infuse the term ‘democracy’ with appropriate meaning and that their 
understandings will, in the last resort, be socially grounded. The importance of having 
this self-assurance cannot be overstated.  The confidence of Belizeans, no less than other 
Caribbean citizens, has thus far been “bottled up within them partly because they have 
conceded to the mystifications of professionals (politicians, economists, lawyers, 
engineers, bureaucrats) that the latter have both the language and the key to governance. 
This has to change and a Caribbean cultural way has to be allowed to emerge from our 
collective wisdom” (Duncan 2003: 171).  
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Conclusion 
 
This work has argued that if an interpretive approach is adopted on the ground, 
Belizean democracy will be seen less as a procedural minimum worthy of protection and 
fossilisation at all costs and instead as something that should be open to confident re-
interpretation, which is likely to align it more closely with the social reality of Belizean 
people. Assertions and assurances, however, that such a re-interpretation will come for 
Belize are fraught with difficulties. First, it clearly may just not happen. This could be 
because Belize may not have the opportunity for meaning re-invention suggested here. 
But it could also be because there is an unavoidable contingency in such 
transformations, necessarily allowing for an opportunity or situation to culminate in any 
number of outcomes (and, indeed, be easily reversed). Belize, in other words, may be 
ripe for democratic change and yet it still may not happen. Time alone will tell in this 
respect.  
 
Second, however, there is an inherent contradiction in claiming that ‘democracy’ 
is primarily an imagined future and yet simultaneously using this same analysis as a 
platform to suggest a program for a socially desirable future. Indeed, for that matter, to 
cautiously aspire to a successful ‘transformative experience’ is to misuse a term that 
should, in the interpretive methodology, only refer to a ‘really existing’ experience 
rather than a potentiality. There is, then, admittedly an uncomfortable fit between the 
first and second stages - analysis and prediction – of the argument submitted here. If the 
first stage of analysis is to offer any value for Belizeans other than historical interest, 
however, this may be an unavoidable discomfort. 
 
Nevertheless, even if one should disagree with predictions or prescriptions for 
the future, this basic analysis still stands. This work concurs with Wydra that “while 
democratic essentialism tries to tame uncertainty and violence through democratically 
shaped institutions…the historical foundations of democracy develop under conditions 
of the absence of constitutional guarantees and of democratic ‘values’” (2007: 270). In 
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Belize, therefore, democracy does not exist as a consequence of British colonial values 
instilled at an early age. In fact the truly democratic values – the rejection of colonial 
oppression rather than the embrace of minimum procedural criteria – have only 
developed as a reaction to this oppressive element in Belizean culture. The argument, 
however, is also that this rejection of colonial oppression has thus far not been fully 
formulated. But to the extent to which democracy does exist, it is a consequence of the 
authoritarian experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism.  
 
If there is one tragic quality to the Belizean understanding of democracy, it lies in 
the people themselves. Gustavo Perera is not unrepresentative of wider opinion when 
he suggests that, “the strength [of Belizean democracy] has to be the people, that the 
people have proved to be very patient, very tolerant and people remain hopeful. People 
keep a certain amount of faith in the process, in the democratic process” (2007). But just 
how much of a strength is this patience in the circumstances? Laurence Whitehead 
perhaps best summarises the tragic futility of such misplaced tolerance when he writes 
that “under the spell of a collectively imagined eventual democracy the citizens of 
defective ‘really existing’ new democracies may sometimes be willing to endure their 
current disappointments encouraged by the belief that at some point the promises of 
their regime will be more fully realised” (2002: 240). The original author of this spell may 
long have disappeared, and the spell may be a compelling one. But this does not make 
any less urgent the need to confront it, and to put Belizeans’ unending pride and 
creativity to achieving more fruitful ends. 
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